Levels of diversification in the portfolios of investors present a puzzle. The benefits of diversification, measured by the rules of mean-variance portfolio theory, have increased in recent years, yet levels of diversification did not increase, remaining much below their optimal levels.
We find that today's optimal level of diversification, measured by the rules of mean-variance portfolio theory, exceeds 120 stocks and argue that the diversification puzzle is solved within Shefrin and Statman's (2000) behavioral portfolio theory. Bloomfield, Leftwhich and Long (1977) that a portfolio of 20 stocks "attains a large fraction of the total benefits of diversification" (p. 25), while Statman (1987) showed that an optimally diversified portfolio must include at least 30 stocks. Yet actual levels of diversification were much lower than 20 or 30 in 1977 and 1987 and they remain much lower than these figures more recently. Goetzmann and Kumar (2001) who studied more than 40,000 stock accounts at a brokerage firm found that the mean number of stocks in a portfolio in the 1991-1996 period was 4 and that the median number was 3, little changed from the 3.41 average reported in 1967 by the Federal Reserve Board Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers (1967) .
We argue that investors fail to diversify their stock portfolios because they consider individual stocks in their portfolios as the equivalent of individual lottery tickets and do not diversify among stocks for the same reason that they do not diversify among lottery tickets. A few stocks, like a few lottery tickets, provide a chance for great riches but a well-diversified portfolio of stocks, like a well-diversified portfolio of lottery tickets, guarantees mediocrity.
Neither lottery buying nor undiversified portfolios are consistent with mean-variance portfolio theory but both are consistent with behavioral portfolio theory.
More than 50 years ago, Friedman and Savage (1948) noted that risk-aversion and riskseeking share roles in our behavior; people who buy insurance policies often buy lottery tickets as well. Four years later, Markowitz (1952a Markowitz ( , 1952b wrote two papers. In one he extended Friedman and Savage's insurance-lottery framework while in the other he created the meanvariance framework. People in the mean-variance framework, unlike people in the insurancelottery framework, never buy lottery tickets; they are always risk-averse, never risk seeking.
Risk-averse people can be expected to buy insurance policies while risk-seeking people can be expected to buy lottery tickets. But why would people buy both? Friedman and Savage (1948) answered the question by noting that people buy lottery tickets because they aspire to reach the riches of higher social classes while they buy insurance as protection against falls into the poverty of lower social classes. Markowitz (1952a) clarified the Friedman-Savage framework by noting that people aspire to move up from their current social class. So people with $10,000 might accept lotterylike odds in the hope of winning $1 million, while people with $1 million might accept lotterylike odds in the hope of winning $100 million. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) extended the work of Friedman and Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952a) into prospect theory. Prospect theory describes people who accept lottery-like odds when they are below their levels of aspirations but reject such odds when they are above their levels of aspirations.
The framework of Friedman-Savage (1948 ), Markowitz (1952a and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is a keystone in Shefrin and Statman's (2000) behavioral portfolio theory. People in behavioral portfolio theory act as if they contain many "doers" each with a different goal and attitude towards risk. People in the simple version of the theory have two doers, a "downside protection" doer whose goal is to avoid poverty and an "upside potential" doer whose goal is a shot at riches. Lottery tickets are best for upside potential doers with high aspiration levels and little money. However, upside potential doers with lower aspiration levels can meet their needs through call options and those with even lower aspiration level can buy stocks.
Diversification in mean-variance portfolio theory
The optimal level of diversification is determined by marginal analysis; diversification should be increased as long as its marginal benefits exceed its marginal costs. The benefits of diversification, in mean-variance portfolio theory, are in the reduction of risk while the costs are transaction and holding costs. Risk is measured in the mean-variance framework by the standard deviation of portfolio returns.
Declining correlations increase the marginal benefits of diversification; Campbell et al (2001) estimated that 50 stocks were required in the 1986-1997 period to reduce the excess standard deviation of portfolios to a levels achieved by 20 stocks in the 1963-1985 period. But was a 20-stock portfolio the optimal portfolio in the early periods? And is a 50-stock portfolio optimal today? Statman (1987) compared the marginal benefits of diversification to its costs using data available in the mid-1980s and concluded that at least 30 stocks were required for an optimally diversified portfolio. He noted that investors could have diversified into 500 stocks by holding a mutual fund, such as the Vanguard 500 index fund, at an annual cost (at the time) of 0.49%. He calculated the marginal benefits of diversification by comparing the expected return of a portfolio of say, 30 stocks, to the expected return of a 500-stock portfolio, levered so that its expected standard deviation is equal to the expected standard deviation of a 30-stock portfolio.
For example, Statman estimated at 0.52% the benefit of increasing diversification from 30 stocks to 500 stocks. An increase of diversification from 30 stocks to 500 stocks is worthwhile since the 0.52% benefit exceeds the 0.49% cost of the Vanguard Index 500 fund. The advantage of a levered 500-stock portfolio over a 30-stock portfolio is even greater once we consider the costs of buying and holding a portfolio of individual stocks. For example, more than 100 stocks were required to exceed the risk reduction benefits of a levered 500-stock portfolio if the annualized cost of buying and holding a portfolio of individual stocks is 0.35%.
The expected standard deviation declines as portfolios become increasingly diversified.
For example, assuming that the correlation between stocks is 0.08, the standard deviation of a 20-stock portfolio is only 35 percent of the standard deviation of a 1-stock portfolio. (See Figure   1 ). However, a 20-stock portfolio is not necessarily optimal even if it attains a large fraction of the total benefits of diversification.
The optimal level of diversification depends on expected correlations among individual stocks, the cost of buying and holding stocks and mutual funds and the expected equity premium.
They have all changed. The expected correlation used by Statman, based on data in Elton and Gruber (1977) , was 0.15. The more recent figure, according to Campbell et al (2001) , was 0.08. (2001) estimated the expected equity premium based on P/E ratios and dividend yield. The average of the two is 3.44%.
Assume that all stocks have an identical expected return, R, an identical expected standard deviations, σ, and that each pair of stocks has an identical expected correlation, ρ.
Consider a portfolio of n randomly chosen and equally weighted stocks. The expected return of the portfolio is equal to R, the expected return of a single stock. The expected standard deviation of a n-stock portfolio is :
The expected standard deviation of the portfolio declines when the number of stocks in the portfolio increases.
Compare a portfolio of n stocks to a portfolio with a larger number of stocks, m. We set m to be 3,444, the number of stocks in the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund. If investors can borrow and lend at a common rate of R f , they can lever a portfolio of m stocks such that the 1 The actual mean annual cost of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund was lower than 0.20% during the 1997-2001 period. Indeed, the mean annual return of the Vanguard fund was higher by 0.06% than the mean annual return of the Wilshire 500 Index, which it tracks. However, good fortune is not guaranteed to continue. We assume that the annual cost of the Vanguard fund is 0.20%.
expected standard deviation of the levered m-stock portfolio is equal to σ n , the expected standard deviation of an n-stock portfolio. The expected return of the levered m-stock portfolio is:
Where σ m is the expected standard deviation of an m-stock portfolio, and EP, the expected equity premium, is the difference between R and R f .
The difference between the expected return of an n-stock portfolio, R, and the expected return of its corresponding levered m-stock portfolio, R nm , is the benefit of increased diversification from n to m stocks, expressed in units of expected returns. It turns out that the optimal level of diversification is greater than 300 stocks when the equity premium is 8.79% and the correlation is 0.08. The benefit of increasing diversification from 300 to 3,444 is 0.15%, equal to the 0.15% net cost of replacing a 300-stock portfolio with the Index fund. The optimal level increases from 300 to 430 stocks if the net cost of the Index fund is 0.10%. (See Table 1 and Figure 2 ).
The benefits of diversification are smaller when the equity premium is smaller. The optimal level of diversification declines to 120 stocks when the correlation remains at 0.08 but the expected equity premium declines from 8.79% to 3.44%. Similarly, the benefits of diversification are smaller when the correlation is higher. While the optimal level of diversification is 300 stocks when the equity premium is 8.79% and the correlation is 0.08, the optimal level is only 70 stocks when the correlation is 0.28. The 0.28 figure is equal to Campbell et al's (2001) estimate of the realized correlation in the early 1960s 2 .
The conservative estimate of the current optimal level for diversification is 120 stocks, based on the 3.44% Fama and French estimate of the equity premium, the 0.08 Campbell et al estimate of the recent correlation among U.S. stocks, and a 0.05% annual expense of holding individual stocks. This estimate is much higher than the rule of thumb reported by Campbell et al (2001) where 20 stocks make a diversified portfolio, or the Rule of Five, holding no fewer than five stocks, advocated by the National Association of Investment Clubs. (Wasik, 1995) In turn, the numbers of stocks advocated in diversification rules of thumb are higher than the average number of stocks held in actual portfolios. Why do investors fail to diversify to levels consistent with the mean-variance portfolio theory? We argue, consistent with behavioral portfolio theory, that investors fail to diversify because undiversified portfolios give them a chance, however small, to reach their aspired riches.
Diversification in behavioral portfolio theory
Mangalindan ( Callisch's aspirations are common, shared by the many who gamble on individual stocks and lottery tickets. Most lose, but some win. Brenner (1990) quoted a lottery winner, a clerk in equity premium is 3.44%. The net benefit of increasing diversification, once we subtract the 0.15% net cost of the Index fund, is 0.72%. Investors who can beat the market by more than 0.72% per year overcome the disadvantage the New York subway system. "I was able to retire from my job after 31 years. My wife was able to quit her job and stay home to raise our daughter. We are able to travel whenever we want to. We were able to buy a co-op, which before we could not afford." (p. 43).
People who hold undiversified portfolios, like people who buy lottery tickets, behave as gamblers since they accept higher risk without compensation in the form of higher expected returns. While gambling behavior is usually recognized as inconsistent with mean-variance portfolio theory, it is often dismissed as no more than a minor irritant to that theory, consisting of minor amounts of "play money" that people gamble for "entertainment." But gambling behavior is a major puzzle to mean-variance portfolio theory since it consumes major amounts. Goetzmann and Kumar (2001) found that, on average, the value of investors' undiversified portfolios was 79% of their annual income.
While gambling behavior is a puzzle to mean-variance portfolio theory, it is a main Moreover, Gambling in America reported that "gamblers were more likely to have their future secured by social security and pension plans than non-gamblers and hold 60 percent more assets…" (p. 66)
The demographics of gamblers are similar to those of undiversified investors. Goetzmann and Kumar (2001) found that the proportion of investors with undiversified portfolios investors is higher among members of the non-professional category, such as bluecollar and clerical workers, than among members of the professional category. Lottery gamblers are similar to undiversified investors if education proxies for occupation. Clotfelter and Cook (1989, p. 96) found that the proportion of lottery buyers is higher among those with low levels of education than among people with high levels. While 49% of those with less than high school education bought lottery tickets during the week of the survey, only 30% of college graduates did. Goetzmann and Kumar (2001) found that the degree of diversification is higher for old investors than for young ones. This is the case for gambling as well. The authors of Gambling in America (1976) wrote: "Gambling is a young person's pursuit." (p. 7). They reported that 73% of 18-24 year olds gambled but only 23% of 65-year olds or older did (p. 2-3). The age pattern of participation in lotteries is somewhat different from the age pattern of gambling in general. Clotfelter and Cook (1989, p. 96) found that the proportion lottery buyers among those who are 65-year old or older is indeed lower than the proportion among younger people but participation in lotteries increases with age up to age 65 and peaks in the 45-65 age group. Goetzmann and Kumar (2001) found no relationship between income and diversification in one period but in another period they found that those with higher incomes held more diversified portfolios than those with low incomes. While Clotfelter and Cook (1989, p. 99-100) found no systematic relationship between income and the absolute amount spent on lotteries, they found a strong relationship between income and the relative amount. In particular, people with low income spent higher proportions of their income on lotteries than people with high income. Similarly, Gambling in America (1976 pp. 103-4) reported that people with low incomes spent higher proportions of their income on gambling than people with high income.
Goetzmann and Kumar (2001) Reduction of risk is always a benefit in mean-variance portfolio theory. The optimal number of stocks in a portfolio exceeds 120 since the benefits of diversification at lower levels of diversification exceed their costs. But reduction of risk is not always a benefit in behavioral portfolio theory. While investors in behavioral portfolio theory, like investors in mean-variance portfolio theory, prefer low risk over high risk in the downside protection layers of their portfolios, they prefer high risk over low risk in the upside potential layers. So investors in behavioral portfolio theory hold money market accounts, bonds and diversified stock mutual funds in their downside protection layers, but they hold a handful of stocks, like a handful of lottery tickets, in their upside potential layers. The optimal number of individual stocks by the rules of behavioral portfolio is the number that balances the chance for an uplift into riches with the chance of a descent into poverty. But what is the right balance?
The desire of investors for the riches of lotteries and individual stocks is strong.
Centuries of education and preaching have not uprooted lotteries and they are not likely to uproot undiversified portfolios. Moreover, there is no good reason to uproot the desire for upside potential, manifested in undiversified portfolios, once the need for downside protection is satisfied. The rules of optimal diversification in behavioral portfolio theory are similar to the rules of suitability that govern brokers and financial advisors.
Suitability regulations require brokers to make sure that investors desire for upside potential does not breach their need for downside protection. Roach (1978) quoted from a Securities Exchange Commission decision where a broker was found liable for recommending a particular stock to investors. "Whether or not customers Z and E considered a purchase of the stock… a suitable investment is not the test for determining the propriety of applicants' conduct.
The test is whether [the broker] fulfilled the obligation he assumed when he undertook to counsel the customers of making only such recommendation as would be consistent with the customer's financial situation and needs." Roach noted: "Both the NASD and the Commission here suggests that suitability is an objective concept which the broker is obliged to observe regardless of a customer's wishes… The NASD's statement that the customer's 'own greed' may well have been their motivation reinforces the idea that the customer is not sovereign for suitability purposes." (p. 1126).
Behavioral portfolios, such as those reflected in the rules of "core and satellite" and "risk budget" are sensible ways to allocate portfolio assets between the upside potential and downside protection layers. Pietranico and Riepe (2002) describe Core and Explore, Schwab's version of core and satellite, as comprised of a well-diversified "core," serving as the "foundation" layer of the portfolio and a less diversified layer of "explore," seeking "returns that are higher than the overall market, which entails greater risk." Similarly, Waring et al (2000) describe portfolios
where the risk budget is allocated to active funds in the hope of upside potential, while the safe budget is allocated to index funds for downside protection.
Conclusion
The optimal number of individual stocks in a portfolio by the rules of mean-variance portfolio theory is greater than 120, but the average number of stocks in actual portfolios is much lower than that. Goetzmann and Kumar (2001) found that the mean number of stocks in more than 40,000 stock portfolios was 4 and the median was 3, much lower than 120 and not much Market Index fund account is $3,000, much lower than the $13,869 median value of the accounts studied by Goetzmann and Kumar (2001) .
The persistence of undiversified portfolios, like the persistence of lotteries, tells us that mean-variance portfolio theory fails to describe the behavior of investors. The behavior of investors is described better in Shefrin and Statman's (2000) behavioral portfolio theory.
Investors in behavioral portfolio theory construct their portfolios as layered pyramids where bottom layers are designed for downside protection while top layers are designed for upside potential. Risk-aversion gives way to risk-seeking at the uppermost layers as they desire to avoid poverty give way to the desire for riches. Some investors fill the uppermost layers with the few stocks of an undiversified portfolio while others fill them with lottery tickets.
Zernike (2002) The annual benefit of an increase in diversification from 120 stocks to 3,444 stocks (as in the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund) is 0.16% when the equity premium is 3.44% and the correlation is 0.08. The net annual cost of such increase in diversification is 0.15%, composed of the 0.20% annual cost of the Vanguard fund less an assumed 0.05% annual cost of buying and holding 120 individual stocks. So the optimal level of diversification exceeds 120 stocks. Benefit of diversification when the correlation between any two stocks is 0.08 and the equity premium is 3.44%. The break-even portfolio contains more than 120 stocks.
Benefit of diversification when the correlation between any two stocks is 0.08 and the equity premium is 8.79%. The break-even portfolio contains more than 300 stocks.
